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FOREWORD 
Inflation has been a major factor affecting the rate of development 
inmostif not all countries of the world. It increases uncertainty of 
investment and affects the welfare of all citizens, especially those in 
the lower income strata. Thus, the possibility that inflation may result 
from shipments of food to nations under a program established partially 
to improve the welfare of low income people and encourage economic develop-
ment raises serious questions. Since it is of such a serious nature, 
economic analysis is required (1) to define the economic relationships 
involved in food aid shipments to allow a clear understanding of these 
processes, and (2) to outline ways of counteracting any inflationary 
tendencies and pressures if they exist. 
Towards these two ends, the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development at Iowa State University invited Dr. Uma K. Srivastava to 
spend a year (1969-70) in study and research of these issues at the Insti-
tute of Economic Growth at Delhi University in India (with support under 
a grant from the Agency for International Development) . He spent a 
similar period at the Center in Ames. This report is an outgrowth of that 
work. Dr. Srivastava has not only achieved the two objectives set out 
in the beginning but also has completed a substantial analysis on the 
effects of changed terms of food aid under the revised Food Aid Act of 
1966. His analysis leads him to a clearly stated measure of the problems 
of debt management and the threat posed by increased debt and interest 
payments to continuing economic development in India. It provides the 
first complete analysis available on the long-run impact of changing 
credit terms with dollar repayment for P.L. 480 shipments. The analysis 
(ii) 
should be useful to all groups associated with food aid programs and their 
contribution to economic development. 
This research represents a cooperative effort among several individ-
uals and institutions. We would like to express our appreciation to the 
Institute of Economic Growth at Delhi University for providing facilities 
to DL Srivastava for his year of study. We are grateful to its ex-director, 
Professor Dhar, for his efforts in facilitating the arrangements for 
study and to Progessor Khusro, the current director, for his intellectual 
contribution to the project. We are confident that it will contribute 
toward an understanding and resolving of an important policy issue. 
This study was made possible through financing by the Agency for 
International Development, contract no. AID/401-43-78-06-1558. 
Earl 0. Heady 
Director 
Leo V. Mayer 
Project Director 
INTRODUCTION 
Countries in the process of development have experienced a gap 
between the domestic supply and the demand for food. Demand for food in 
these countries has increased rapidly with an increase in per capita income. 
Because of the lack of irrigation facilities, means of communication, and 
inflow of modern inputs, however, domestic supply of foodgrains has not 
kept pace, Given an open economy and adequate foreign exchange, such 
a food gap need not inhibit the process of economic growth. Surplus export 
earnings can be used to buy food from abroad. If a gap simultaneously 
exists in foreign exchange [18], however, the food gap becomes a serious 
constraint on economic growth. Use of imports to bridge the food gap can 
necessitate either a cut in the installation of new industrial capacity 
(via a reduction in the imports of capital goods), or less than full 
utilization of existing capacity because of a cut in the necessary raw-
material imports). Under these circumstances, the availability of food 
aid can reduce or eliminate the necessity for diverting foreign exchange 
from non-food to food imports. Therefore, food aid permits a larger volume 
of real investment and, consequently, a faster rate of growth than other-
wise feasible [20]. 
Food aid under the U.S. Public Law 480 has helped to bridge the food 
gap in recipient countries for a decade and a half. But the growth-
promoting effects of the U.S, food aid have been obscured by the contro-
versy over the price-depressing effect of the aid on the one hand, and 
the role of counterpart funds and their inflationary implications on the 
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other. Since many recipient countries have recently been able to stop 
food imports, the question of the price-depressing effect of food aid on 
agricultural prices has been relegated to mere historical importance. The 
problems related to the generation and use of counterpart funds and to 
the need for evolving an appropriate policy toward final disbursement of 
these funds, however, remain acute. This study is designed mainly to 
analyze the problems associated with the counterpart funds in India, the 
largest recipient of food aid. 
Statement of the Problem in India 
India began to experience a worsening balance of payments position 
and the emergence of food shortages in the initial years of the Second 
Five Year Plan (1956-61). These events coincided with the enactment of 
2 P.L. 480 in the United States, which was designed to prevent a decline 
in prices and farm incomes. This Act facilitated the purchase of U.S. 
surplus farm products by India and other developing countries against 
their local currencies. 3 Imports of surplus u.s. farm products into India 
under P.L. 480 began near the end of 1956. Since then India has signed 
nine additional agreements and 33 additional supplementary agreements for 
the imports of commodities worth $4,445.5 million (through April, 1969). 4 
1For the controversy on the price depressing effect, see [2,5,17,23, 
27,28,29,38,41]; also for the controversy on monetary impact, see [7,11, 
12,13,19,26,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,39,40,42]. 
2 For a glossary of abbreviations used in this study, see Appendix A. 
3Title I: It provides for the sale of u.s. agricultural commodities 
to the recipient countries for their local currencies. 
4The policy of importing foodgrains under P.L. 480 to check the ex-
cessive and unbridled rise in their prices received emphatic support from 
the Foodgrain Inquiry Committee in India [9]. 
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India has been the largest single recipient of aid under this Act. 
In India, P.L. 480 foodgrains were released to consumers by the 
Government, mainly through a system of Fair Price Shops. The increased 
supplies of food grains were used to meet the additional demand arising 
from (a) increased money incomes from development expenditures and (b) 
population growth. But the additional foodgrain supplies have not been 
tied to a particular project. This system of Fair Price Shops has, inci-
dently, acted as a built-in mechanism to minimize the price-depressing 
effect of food aid on incentives to domestic producers [27,41]. 
The procedure for handling the counterpart funds, however, is some-
what complex. According to the terms of the agreements, the Government 
of India (GOI) has to pay the total amount of imports to the u.s. Embassy 
Account in rupees as soon as commodities arrive at various Indian ports. 
The deposits in the U.S. Embassy Account is immediately invested in the 
GO! special securities pending its final disbursement. 5 Later, a major 
portion of these funds is released to the GO! in the form of (1) loans 
and (2) grants, notionally tied to various plan projects. A small portion 
6 
of the total funds is earmarked for (3) the u.s. uses, and (4) Cooley 
7 loans. The funds earmarked for the latter two uses remain invested in 
5rn the procedure before 1960, the funds were not immediately invested 
in the GO! special securities; instead they were held at the State Bank of 
India (SBI). The procedural aspects will be considered in detail in the 
next section. 
6The items of the U.S. use from rupee counterpart funds are listed 
in Section 104 of the u.s. Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance 
Act. 
7The Cooley Amendment to the u.s. P.L. 480 "provides that up to 25 
percent of the local currency proceeds from the sale of American agricul-
tural commodities shall be made available for lending in the private sector 
Continued. 
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special securities pending disbursement. In practice, a considerable 
time lag exists between accruals and withdrawals of funds for all four 
types of uses. 
From the legal point of view, P.L. 480 counterpart funds can be 
broken down into two parts: (i) a portion that is tied to various projects 
in the form of loans and grants, whether withdrawn or not, (ii) a portion 
that, although earmarked for loans and grants, has yet to be linked offi-
cially with the projects. The GOI budget shows the entire volume of funds 
accrued during the financial year (except the portion actually withdrawn 
for the U.S. and Cooley loans and losses in the form of subsidies to 
price in the Fair Price Shops) as receipts, and money is appropriated. 
Thus, to sum-up the position on the monetary side of the transaction so 
far, although a portion of counterpart funds is yet to be officially allo-
cated for loans and grants to GOI and another portion is yet to be with-
drawn for the U.S. and Cooley uses at a future date, the entire volume of 
funds has been restored back to the economy by the GOI in the very year 
of its accrual. This action is consistent with the very purpose of food 
aid, which is to promote a larger volume of investment. 
At the same time, food imports have been released to the public for 
consumption through the chain of Fair Price Shops. Demand for these shops 
has been a function of prices in the Shops, prices in the open market, 
Footnote 7 continued. to two categories of borrowers: (1) American 
firms or their subsidaries operating in the host country (India) or (2) 
indigeneous firms (Indian firms) which have no affiliation with an American 
firm but are facilitating the disposal of American agricultural products, 
e.g., local private warehouses storing grains or flour mills processing 
the grains, " The U.S. Information Service, Fact-Sheet on Economic Assis-
tance to India, New Delhi, February, 1970. 
- 5 -
per capita incomes, and P.L. 480 imports [27]. Artificially (government-
fixed) low prices in the Fair Price Shops have also contributed to an 
increase in food demand from these Shops, and the entire quantum of P.L. 
480 supplies have been absorbed in the economy in the same year of their 
. 8 1.mports. 
Thus, in a~-~ transaction, the U.S. Embassy is left with the 
special securities of the GOI. Then at a later date, when the funds are 
to be disbursed, the GOI has to find money to redeem the special securities. 
The redemption of special securities for meeting loan and grants to the 
GOI merely amounts to simultaneous book entries in the GOI budget (as will 
be explained in the next section). But the redemption of special securi-
ties for meeting the U.S. and Cooley loans in this case would amount to a 
net outgo from the GOI budget. Its expansionary impact on money supply 
will be taken up in detail in the next section. In a situation of contin-
uous inflow of real aid, however, the expansionary impact of_ lagged with-
drawal of funds for the u.s. and Cooley uses is nullified by the current 
imports of foodgrains. But whenever the imports cease, withdrawals of 
these accumulated funds will not be matched by a grain flow from abroad. 
It is in this situation that the expansionary impact of withdrawing 
accumulated funds on money supply and of finding ways to minimize them 
become highly relevant. As will be discussed later, India has reached 
this point as a result of the "green revolution," that has led to an 
8The relative fixity of prices at a very low level in the Fair 
Price Shops, while the open market prices went on increasing, resulted in 
a shift of more consumers to the Fair Price Shops. This raised the off-
takes of imported grain to a higher level than would have been the case 
had the imported grain been released on the commercial basis at a higher 
price [8,41]. 
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unprecedented increase in domestic foodgrains production. Furthermore, 
besides the withdrawals for the u.s. and Cooley uses, allocations for loan 
repayments and interest payments on previous P .L. 480 local currency loans by 
the GOI will swell the volume of these funds. These loan repayments and 
interest payments will continue (on the basis of present loans) up to 
the year 2010. Since U.S. needs are met by a very small fraction of 
accumulating funds, these funds will continue to present a latent infla-
tionary threat. 
Recently, however, two developments have taken place that provide 
some elbow room for maneuvering with these funds. First, the recent 
Mondale Amendment has removed the legal obstacle to use of these funds for 
purposes other than those listed in section 104 of the Act. In the "sur-
plus currency" countries like India, these surplus funds can now be trans-
ferred from the U.S. accounts to the accounts of the aid-receiving countries. 
Secondly, since the recent success of new agricultural strategy, India 
not only has become self sufficient in foodgrains, but also may be able 
to generate some domestic food surplus over the present level of economic 
9 demand. In view of this fact, the avenues for utilizing P.L. 480 funds 
for labor intensive projects should be explored. 
In addition to the monetary problem created by past loans and 
interest payments, another problem has resulted from recent change-over 
of P.L. 480 aid from Title I to Title IV (Recipient countries have to pay 
for aid commodities in dollars under Title IV instead of local currencies 
9This does not mean that the nutrituional demand (demand calculated 
on the basis of nutritionally recommended quantitiesperperson) has been 
satisfied. Nutritional levels per capita still remain one of the lowest 
in Asia. 
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under Title I. This change will be referred to as hardening of aid terms 
in following pages). This problem requires a serious look also at the 
magnitude of additional debt-service obligations in foreign currencies 
imposed by the aid. Before the Amendment of 1966, P.L. 480 commodity aid, 
unlike other aid, did not require loan repayments and interest payments 
in terms of dollars. But the 1966 Amendment asked for a progressive 
shift from imports for foreign currencies to imports on credit terms that 
require payments in dollars spread over a long term. Post-1966 agreements 
between India and the u.s. already contain an increasing proportion of 
dollar-repayable food aid. In India the ratio of projected debt-servicing 
requirements to projected export earnings is already very high. From 
this perspective, the present study attempts to project the absolute mag-
nitude of additions to debt-servicing charges and to determine the ratio 
of debt-service to exports under various sets of assumptions. 
Objectives and Organization of the Study 
The objectives of this study are: (1) To determine whether the 
issue of monetary expansion caused by P.L. 480 counterpart funds in the 
Indian economy has any real economic substance, when the time lag in P.L. 
480 operations is taken into account, (i) while the imports of food and 
fibers continue, and (ii) when the imports under P.L. 480 aid cease. 
(2) To examine the generation and use of P.L. 480 counterpart funds by the 
U.S. authorities in India and the consequences for the Indian economy. 
(3) To analyze the impact of change in the terms of P.L. 480 aid on debt-
service charges and the consequent implications for the balance of pay-
ments in India. 
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This study is divided into three sections. The first section reviews 
the controversy over the expansionary impact of P.L. 480 counterpart funds 
on the money supply in the light of empirical evidence. The second section 
analyzes the problems associated with the accumulating U.S.-owned rupee 
funds. It also explores the consequences of using these funds for various 
alternatives. The third section deals with the effects of changed terms 
of P.L. 480 aid after 1966 on India's repayment obligations and estimates 
the requirements on foreign aid. A brief summary of findings has been 
included at the end. 
COUNTERPART FUNDS AND MONEY SUPPLY IN INDIA 
There has been a long-standing controversy in India over the infla-
10 tionary implications of P.L. 480 counterpart funds. The conclusion that 
a possible inflationary effect exists, however, has been based primarily 
on an analysis of complex bookkeeping entries in the GOI budget with res-
pect to a ~-~ import transaction. Furthermore, most of the partici-
11 pants in the controversy have tended to treat any change in money supply 
resulting from the use of counterpart funds in a ~-~ transaction, as 
necessarily having a similar effect on prices. In other words, any expan-
sionary, neutral, or contractionary effects of P.L. 480 on money supply 
are interpreted as having an automatic inflationary, neutral, or deflationary 
impact on prices. 12 This interpretation of a change in money supply caused 
by P.L. 480 counterpart funds completely ignores the fact that P.L. 480 aid 
10It is shown by the magnitude of recent literature on the subject. 
See: [7,11,12,13,15,26,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,39,40,42]. 
11Money supply in India is composed of a currency component (viz. 
currency notes and coins with the public excluding the 
balances of the Central and State Governments and cash on hand of Scheduled 
and reporting non-Scheduled banks and Cooperative banks) and a deposit 
component (demand deposits of banks and other deposits with the RBI). 
Money supply as thus defined constitutes the monetary liability of the 
banking system. Since the liabilities and assets of the banking system 
always balance, any change in the monetary liability is to be reflected 
either in the financial assets or non-monetary liabilities of the banking 
system. 
12such an analysis implicitly assumes (i) that no portion of the 
additional money supply will be absorbed by an incremental demand for 
holding of money and (ii) that a balanced budget will not necessarily lead 
to any change in prices. The Keynesian framework of analysis defines the 
motives of holding money as (a) for speculation, (b) for transactions, and 
(c) for precautionary purposes. Any one of these motives might lead to 
a change in the demand for holding money. Further, we also know that the 
government outlays even if financed only out of taxes, in a balanced bud-
get framework, could lead to a net expansion in demand and a ceteris paribus 
rise in prices, depending on where the outlays go, see [16,42]. 
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involves an inflow of real goods into the economy. The changes in money 
supply alone, therefore, cannot be interpreted as inflationary or defla-
tionary. The contention that P.L. 480 counterpart fund operations cause 
an increase in existing money stock is based on two implicit conditions: 
A Necessary Condition: The actual disbursement of counterpart funds for 
development projects, U.S. uses and Cooley funds must be equal to the 
realization of sale proceeds from, the public, or where, I is government g 
investment expenditure, U is u.s. and Cooley fund withdrawals and S is p 
the amount of sale proceeds. 
bi + bU = bS g p 
A SufficiencyCondition: The equality between accrual of the sale proceeds 
and their disbursement must hold within the same time period, 13 that is 
bSt=l 
p 
In India, it is the non-fulfillment of the sufficiency condition 
which is the crux of the entire controversy over the expansionary impact 
of P.L. 480 counterpart funds on the money supply. As seen in the analysis 
that follows, however, the non·fulfillment of the sufficiency condition 
has different effects in a situation of continuous inflow of real aid than 
it does in the event of ~-~ inflow of aid. In this section we pro-
pose to examine the impact of P.L. 480 counterpart fund operations on 
money supply in the light of empirical evidence relating to the Indian 
economy. Before proceeding with the analysis, it may be useful to discuss 
briefly the procedural aspects used in the later analysis. 
13 Because all the operations are processed through the GOI budget, 
the time period is one financial year. 
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Procedural Aspects 
A number of financial transactions are involved in P.L. 480 aid. As 
soon as commodities arrive at Indian ports, the GOI must pay the u.s. Embassy 
Account in rupees for the P.L. 480 food and fibers. 14 Until May, 1960, the 
u.s. Embassy Account was held in the State Bank of India (SBI); but later, 
however, it was transferred to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The 
accumulated unused funds in the U.S. Embassy Account were transferred to 
h RBI . b f d . 11 15 t e 1n a num er o agree upon 1nsta ments. In the pre-1960 pro-
cedure, P.L. 480 counterpart funds were initially invested in government 
securities pending withdrawals. This procedure increased the credit ratio 
of the SBI and, therefore, the money supply; it also overstated the bank 
16 
credit to the government sector. 
Under the new procedure, however, the RBI invests these funds in the 
special securities of the GOI. Eventually these special securities are to 
be redeemed to meet the final disbursement demands arising out of the allo-
cations of funds for the loans and grants to the GOI, for Cooley loans, and 
14 Before the amendment of October 8, 1964, 50 percent of the freight 
charges also were paid in rupees, but, after the amendment the entire 
freight charges were borne in dollars. 
15P.L. 480 funds were to be transferred from the SBI to the RBI as 
follows: (i) Rs. 12 crores each month from July, 1960, to June, 1961; 
(ii) Rs. 10 crores each month from November, 1962, to March, 1963; (iii) 
Rs. 6 crores each month from November, 1963, to March, 1964; (iv) Rs. 8 
crores each month from November, 1964, to March, 1965; and (v) Rs. 5 crores 
in November, 1965, and Rs. 4 crores each month from December, 1965 to 
March, 1966. Compiled from The Reserve Bank of India Bulletins. 
16rt has been found that "P.L. 480 deposits enabled the State Bank 
of India to divert more funds from government securities to make larger 
advances that would otherwise have been possible. To the extent the State 
Bank used P.L. 480 to increase its credit ratio, it increased the money 
supply with the public." [23, p. 22]. Besides, "the old procedure used to 
over-state the time deposits of the private sector with the banks, as well 
as bank investments in the government securities, hence overstating the 
government deposits with the Reserve Bank and the Reserve Bank's holding 
of rupee securities" [ 19]. 
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for the U.S. uses. Before the final disbursement can take place, however, 
some technical formalities have to be completed. Each P.L. 480 agreement 
between India and the United States must be followed by a loan agreement 
for the earmarked amount. Subsequently, several project agreements must 
be entered into between the GOI and the u.s. authorities. But delays in 
completion of these technical formalities have led to the emergence of 
time lags, which we referred to earlier. The phenomenon of time lags is 
not confined to funds earmarked for loans and grants to GOI and for loans 
to Cooley. It occurs as well in funds meant for use by the United States. 
Indeed, the rate of increase in actual withdrawals of funds for the u.s. 
uses is much slower than the rate of increase in funds earmarked for this 
purpose. 
Analysis of P.L. 480 Counterpart Funds in Disaggregative Terms 
To analyze the impact of time lags between accrual and disbursement 
of counterpart funds on money supply, P.L. 480 transactions are at first 
isolated from other banking-sector transactions with the government sector. 
This will be termed isolation assumption, and it will be relaxed later in 
the analysis. With this framework in mind, let us divide the operations 
connected with P.L. 480 into three phases, viz., (i) payment for P.L. 480 
imports by the GOI and investment of these funds for the u.s. by the RBI in 
the GOI special securities, (ii) the sale of foodgrains to the public, 
and (iii) the final disbursement of counterpart funds for the earmarked uses. 
First Phase: Let us assume that we have isolated P.L. 480 trans-
actions from the other budgetary transactions so that we can proceed with 
zero budgetary receipts. There is, of course, some time lapse in the 
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distribution process before the sale proceeds actually can be recovered, 
even though the payment to the U.S. Embassy Account has to be made as 
soon as the imported commodities arrive at various ports. So, if one 
observes the conventional budgetary practice in India, the GO! has to 
borrow from the RBI by issuing ad hocs17 to match the amount. This means 
increases in the financial assets of the banking system and in the money 
supply. But, under the new procedure, the deposits in the U.S. Embassy 
Account have to be invested instantaneously in the special securities. 
Therefore, the earlier increase in financial assets is nullified, except 
for any incidental charges. The result is two bookkeeping entries at RBI 
but no change in total money supply. 
Second Phase: In the second phase, the commodities are sold to the 
public, and the sale proceeds are realized. Under the isolation assumption, 
these proceeds will create positive cash balances of the GO! with the RBI. 
Consequently, the nonmonetary liabilities of the banking system will in-
crease and lead to a contraction in the money supply. A small part of the 
contraction will go to neutralize the earlier expansion of money supply 
due to any incidental charges. The remaining contraction will result in 
a deflationary impact until the GO! spends its cash balances. 
Third Phase: In this phase, the counterpart funds finally are dis-
bursed for all earmarked uses; viz., loans and grants to the GOI, Cooley 
loans, and U.S. uses. The special securities are to be redeemed to finance 
the expenditures for the earmarked uses. These expenditures offset the 
contraction in the money supply outlined in the second phase. 
17Ad hoes are the treasury bills issued by the GO! to the RBI for 
temporary credit. 
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Now, if all phases of P.L. 480 operations fall within one financial 
year (i.e., if the necessary as well as the sufficiency conditions are 
fulfilled) the impact of these operations on money supply will be neutral, 
and the agreed-upon projects will be financed without adding to the exist-
ing money stock. But, if these conditions are not met, additional monetary 
expansion can take place. To see the effect of nonfulfillment of the 
sufficiency condition, let us consider an illustration in which the third 
phase is not fully completed within one financial year. The illustration 
involves a ~-~ import transaction. 
In the following hypothetical example, the value of food and fiber 
imports is assumed to be Rs. 100 crores, with Rs. 8 crores taken as inci-
dental charges. Assuming there is no subsidy, the net impact of phase 
one and two is a contraction of money supply by Rs. 100 crores (Table 1). 
Further, it is assumed that only Rs. SO crores finally are withdrawn from 
this amount by the u.s. Embassy for meeting the claims of the GOI (Rs. 20 
crores as loans and Rs. 20 crores for grant), Cooley loans (Rs. S crores), 
and Embassy expenditures (Rs.Scrores) in the initial year. The remaining 
amount of Rs. SO crores is withdrawn in the second year. The impact of 
this phase can be seen in Table 2. 
In the first year, there remains a contraction in the money supply 
to the extent of Rs. SO crores, which is neutralized only in the second 
year. The total money supply will decline in the first year. In the 
second year, the situation will be reversed because expenditures will not 
be matched by surplus food. Thus the nonfulfillment of the sufficiency 
condition results in a monetary contraction and expansion at different 
points of time under the isolation assumption. In a situation of continuous 
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Table 1. Impact of Phase I and II of P.L. 480 Transactions in Disaggregative Terms 
in the First Year 
Opera-
tion 
1. 
2. 
1. 
Changes in Net Changes 
Financial Nonmonetary Bank in the 
Transaction assets Liabilities Credit Money 
Asset Amount Asset Amount to Supply 
Gov't 
(Rs. crores) 
Payment for P.L. 480 Ad hoc 100 108 108 
food to the Reserve Treasury 
Bank Bills 
For meeting the 8 incidentals 
u.s. Embassy investment Gov't 100 -100 -100 
in special securities cash 
by the RBI balances 
Net Impact of Phase I Ad hoes 8 8 8 (transactions: 1 & 2) 
Sale of imported food 108 
-108 -108 
grains and recovery 
of proceeds from the 
private parties 
Net Impact of Phase II 108 
-108 -108 
Net Impact of Phase I 100 
-100 -100 and II 
Note: Adapted from [26]. Incidental charges of handling and distribution 
have been brought into the picture. 
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Table 2. Impact of Final Disbursement of P.L. 480 Counterpart Funds on the Money 
Supply in the First and Second Years 
Changes in Net Bank 
Financial Nonmonetary Credit Change 
Transactions Assets Liabilities to in the 
Asset Amount Asset Amount Govern- Money 
ment Supply 
( Rs. crores) 
First Year 
Net Impact of Phase Govern- 100 -100 -100 
I and II ment 
balance 
Disbursement of P.L. Govern- -so 50 50 
480 Counterpart ment 
funds in the First cash 
year balance 
Net Impact of Phase I, 50 -50 -50 
II and III in the 
First Year 
Second Year 
Net Impact of the Phase 50 -50 -50 
I, II & III in the 
First Year 
Disbursement of the -so 50 50 
Counterpart funds in 
Second Year 
Net Impact of the P. L. 0 0 0 
operations on the 
First and Second years 
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imports, however, even the expansionary impact as depicted in the second 
year may or may not result since the withdrawals of last year's accumulated 
funds may be offset by the sale proceeds from the current year's imports. 
With continuous imports of approximately constant magnitude, no substantial 
expansionary impact is likely to result. Furthermore, if all three phases 
of counterpart fund operations are completed in one financial year, the 
possibilities for expansionary impact do not arise. 
The Impact of P,L. 480 Transactions in the Totality of Other Budgetary 
Transactions 
So far the analysis of the impact of P.L. 480 transactions on money 
supply has been conducted in isolation from other budgetary transactions. 
The isolation assumption may now be relaxed, With the relaxation of the 
isolation assumption, the P.L. 480 transactions form part of the budget of 
the GOI. Now, within the earlier framework of analysis, the contractionary 
effect in the first year and the expansionary impact in the second year 
may or may not be obtained, depending upon the surplus and the deficit 
of the GOI budget as a whole. Since the budget in India has always been 
in deficit, the critics allege a double use of P.L. 480 counterpart funds: 
(a) in the form of the sale proceeds and (b) in the form of the actual 
18 disbursement of the counterpart funds, This double use of counterpart funds 
forms the basis of the contention that P .L. 480 counterpart funds have an 
18rn the words of Professor Shenoy, "The final disbursement by the 
USAID from the counterpart funds would demand the monetization of special 
securities, e.g., the creation of money by the Reserve Bank against the 
treasury bills, for redeeming the special securities as the cash balance 
being at the minimum the government will have no funds to redeem the 
special securities." See B,R, Shenoy [31]. 
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expansionary impact on money supply. 
It can be shown that the argument about double use of funds is incor-
rect in the real case of continuous import transaction. In the continuous 
process of imports under P.L. 480, the problems of redeeming the past 
securities, because of time lags, arises only when the present accruals 
fall short of present disbursement of funds in any financial year. Here, 
too, the lagged disburs~ent for loans and grants to the GO! do not add 
to a surplus or a deficit. Only the lagged withdrawals for the U.S. uses 
and Cooley funds add to the deficit, if the fresh accruals in any year fall 
short of the amount. This can be stated more formally as follows: 
(a) Continuous imports First of all, some of the logical steps of 
earlier analysis, viz., .the initial creation of ad hoes to pay for P.L. 
480 imports and subsequent investment in special securities by the Reserve 
Bank became redundant in view of their accounting significance only. 
Therefore, we can begin the analysis with the actual realization of the 
sale proceeds. For the time being let us assume that the sale proceeds 
are equal to the economic cost (initial payment to U.S. Embassy+ incidentals). 
In real practice, there are losses on the State Trading account because 
of a subsidy to the price in Fair Price Shops. The sale proceeds are 
earmarked for the four types of uses. Let Xli' x2i,x3i and x4i represent 
the loans to the GO! grants to the GOI, u.s. uses, and Cooley loans, 
respectively, in the period i. (Period represents a financial year, i.e., 
April-March). Also let 
xli + x2i + x3i + x4i = Y i · • .... · • · · · · • • .. • • • .. · • • (l) 
wherein, Yi is the sale proceeds out of P.L. 480 imports. Let pli' Pzi' 
p3i and p4i be the proportion of the fresh accruals of the sale proceeds 
earmarked for loans to GO! grants to GOI, u.s. uses, and Cooley loans. 
- 19 -
That is, 
X - p y 
-xi Ki i K = 1, 2, 3, 4, ••••..•. (2) 
Now, the whole of the earmarked amount is not actually disbursed 
in the same period, as we have seen earlier. Let CKi (K = 1, 2, 3, 4) be 
the proportion actually disbursed for the earmarked purpose out of ~i 
(K = 1, 2, 3, 4). Officially undisbursed funds continue to remain invested 
in special securities. Besides this amount, the loan repayment and 
interest payments by GO! and the funds transferred from the SBI to the RBI 
also remain invested in special securities. So, by the end of the first 
period, the amount invested in the special securities is: 
where s1 is the investment in special securities, P1 = loan repayment by 
the GOI, M1 =interest payment by the GOI, and r 1 =transfer from the SBI 
to the Reserve Bank. R1 and o1 represent the Cooley fund principal repay-
ment and interest payments, respectively, and r 1 stands for the interest 
payment by GO! on the net investments in special securities. We note 
that, in the first period, P1 = 0 and M1 = 0 because the terms of the loan 
repayments are such that they start after a certain period from the date 
of the first disbursement of the loan. Similarly, r 1 = 0 because the 
transfers started as late as 1960, after the change of the procedure for 
holding the funds. Also, in the first period, R1 = 0 and 01 = 0 because 
these repayments and interest payments have started at a very late stage. 
(i) Net Budgetary Support in the First Period Now, the net budgetary 
support, which is an index of the noninflationary finance mobilized in the 
first year (the investment sustained by P.L. 480 commodities has been much 
- 20 -
more, but this index represents the least amount of noninflationary 
investment), can be written as: 
4 
Bl = xllcll + x21c21- (Pl+Ml+Tl+rl) +k:1\.i(l-Cki) + 
L1 has been introduced to take into account the loss on the State Trading 
Account (economic cost minus sales proceeds) which arises from the sub-
sidized sale price of imported grain through the Fair Price Shops. In 
simplified terms, it comes to: 
In economic terms, this means that in the first year not only the 
amounts earmarked for loans and grants (both actually disbursed and not 
disbursed in the form of investment in special securities) but also the 
undrawn amount for u.s. uses and Cooley funds are used as budgetary 
receipts in the first period, itself. Losses on the State Trading account, 
of course, go to reduce the net budgetary support. 
(ii) Net Budgetary Support in the Second Period In the second period, 
out of the earmarked amounts, there will be some leftovers from the second 
period's actual accruals. As in the first year these leftovers will 
increase the investments in special securities, but at the same time there 
will be some lagged withdrawals fiDm the leftover funds of the first year 
for all the earmarked purposes, and these will reduce the investment in 
special securities. Therefore, the net increase in investment in sp~cial 
securities at the end of the second period will be: 
- 21 -
where dKl represents the lagged withdrawal of the earmarked funds from 
~1 • We note that: 
K = 1, 2, 4 ••• (6a) and 
k = 3 ••• (6b) 
Thus, finally, the support of P.L. 480 counterpart funds to the 
budget of the GO! can be written as: 
••••• (7) 
In simplified terms, it means: 
This holds good until the imports continue under P.L. 480 program (i.e., 
Y. > 0). Thus, more generally, in any period i we have the net budgetary 
l. 
support as: 
(b) When P.L. 480 Imports Cease Now, if the imports cease, Y. 
l. 
(fresh realizations of sale proceeds) will become zero in the ith period. 
Then Xli' x2i, x3i, x4i, and Li will be zero. But Oi, Ri, dJi' and d4i 
will not vanish; hence our general form of the equation will be reduced to: 
Bi = (Ri + Oi) - (d3i + d4i) •• • •.•.••. • .• • •.••.•..• • •.•...•.••. (10) 
Since (R. + 0 ) < (d3 . + d4 .), it is the lagged withdrawal of these U.S. and l. i l. l. 
Cooley funds that will not be matched by the grain flows from abroad. The 
problems associated with these portions of counterpart fund accruals are 
taken up in detail in the next section. 
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Net Support of P.L. 480 Transactions to the GOI Budget During 1956-57 and 
1968-69. 
In India, there was always a continuous budgetary deficit during 
the period of 1956-57 to 1968-69 except for the year 1960-61. But to 
arrive at a conclusion about the effect of P.L. 480 operations on money 
supply we have to see the values of the net support of these operations 
to the budget. As we have already seen, if the net support is positive 
(and total money supply is reduced), it can be asserted with certainty that 
P.L. 480 counterpart funds have helped to reduce the budgetary deficit. 
In other words, these counterpart funds have supported larger GOI expend-
itures without resorting to an additional budgetary deficit. Since imports 
of agricultural products under P.L. 480 have been positive between 1956-57 
and 1968-69, the net support has always been positive. The calculations 
to support this outcome are presented in Table 3. 
The net support of P.L. 480 aid to the GOI budget has ranged between 
Rs. 23.12 crores and Rs. 370.01 crores. So far, in no period has the 
budgetary support of P.L. 480 operations been negative. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that P.L. 480 operations have helped to finance larger 
development to this extent without enlarging the budgetary deficit. 
In regard to the impact of P.L.480 operations on money supply, the 
monetary contraction because of sales of foodgrains has been nullified by 
a flow back into the economy via the u.s.-use expenditures, Cooley loans, 
and expenditures on developmental projects (including the funds that were 
officially allocated and the balances that remain invested in special 
securities). Therefore, it can be concluded that P.L. 480 transactions 
have had a neutral effect on money supply. 
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To see the significance of P.L. 480 net support, we can look at 
the percentage of net support to the total budgetary receipts. Although 
there have been year-to-year variations in the percentage, the average 
support for the period has been 5.72 percent of the budget, which is a 
significant proportion. Since P.L. 480 imports ceased, net support will 
become negative. This means not only that 5.7 percent more budgetary re-
ceipts will have to be mobilized to have the same sized budget but also 
that enough funds will have to be mobilized to meet interest and principal 
payments on past P.L. 480 rupee loans. 
Here, incidently, a difference between the earlier aid repayable 
in rupees under P.L. 480 and the aid repayable in dollars may be pointed 
out. In the case of dollar aid, allocations for specified uses will be 
zero, and funds will not be earmarked, yet the GOI will get the funds 
from the sale proceeds of products imported under P.L. 480. In Table 3 
these proceeds are reflected in the positive figure of Loss on the State 
Trading Account in the last year. This means that, as long as imports 
under P.L. 480 continue in any form, the net support may or may not become 
negative depending upon the magnitude of lagged withdrawals for U.S. use 
and Cooley funds and upon the fresh accruals in the form of receipts on 
the State Trading Account (L.). 
~ 
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GENERATION AND USE OF U.S.-USE RUPEE FUNDS IN INDIA 
Commodity agreements between India and the United States earmark a 
small portion of P.L. 480 counterpart funds for exclusive u.s. uses. 
Besides this source of funds, U.S.-use funds (relating to P.L. 480) also 
accrue from loan repayment, interest payment by the GOI, loan repayments, 
and interest payments by private firms under Cooley loans, and interest 
earned on special securities in which funds are invested until final dis-
bursement. P.L. 480 rupee funds for the U.S. use now total Rs. 267 crores, 
and if one includes all rupee funds (P.L. 480 and other than P.L. 480 as 
well), the total at the end of fiscal year 1969 stood at Rs. 551 crores. 
Although the accrual of the U.S. use funds from initial sales has come to 
an end since the cessation of imports themselves, the rupee funds will 
continue to mount because of reflows from the loans to the GOI and private 
firms. On the basis of existing agreements, reflows will continue to add 
to the U.S. accounts until the year 2010. 
As the situation stands now, imported food as well as the sale pro-
ceeds have already been appropriated and absorbed into the economy. There-
fore, the lagged withdrawals of the U.S.-owned accumulated funds (including 
the reflows to the U.S. Account until the year 2010) will necessitate the 
redemption of special securities or direct payments by the GOI and, there-
fore, a net outgo from the budget (in the framework already specified 
in the previous section). But the current outlook for the U.S. needs in 
India is much smaller than the increase in the u.s.-owned fund, with the 
result that excess funds will continue to accumulate even if the real aid 
stops immediately. These accumulating funds present a latent threat of 
- 26 -
inflationary pressure. The recent Mondale Amendment, however, gives a 
legal sanction for the use of these funds by the recipient country. This 
section will explore the possibilities and consequences of using these 
surplus funds in India. 
Generation of U,S,-Owned Rupee Funds 
Table 4 presents the projections of reflows to the u.s. account 
until the end of the year 2010 on the basis of the existing loans at the 
end of the fiscal year 1969. These projections show that total U,S.-owned 
funds will grow at a compound rate of 19.6, 14.2, 12.4, and 6.6 percent 
during 1969-74, 1969-79, 1969-84 and 1969-2010, respectively (Table 5). 
As loans are repaid, the rate of growth continues to fall. It will become 
negligible (an interest of 1.5 percent will continue to accrue even after 
every other source goes dry) after the year 2010. Even if we take the 
rate of increase over the period as a whole ~.6percent), it is fairly 
rapid considering the large base (Rs. 551 crores at the end of fiscal 1969). 
The increase of the U,S,-owned rupee funds consists of five components: 
(1) principal repayments of Cooley loans, (2) interest payments on Cooley 
loans, (3) loan repayments by the GOI, (4) interest payments by the GOI, 
and (5) interest payments by the RBI on special securities. The average 
contribution of loan repayments and interest payments by the GOI to the 
U.S.-owned funds works out to be approximately 70 percent for the period 
(Table 6). Then come the loan repayments and interest payments by private 
firms under Cooley loans. If one assumes that nothing is withdrawn from 
these balances, the average contributionofthe interest on special secur-
ities to total increase in u.s. use funds continues to decline because the 
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Table 5. Rate of Growth of PL 480 Funds In India on the Basis of the 
Existing Agreements Up To the End of fiscal year 1969 
variables 
1. Principal repayment 
Cooley funds 
2. Interest Payment 
3. Loan Repayment 
by GOI (104 f) 
4. Interest Payments 
s. Interest on P. L. 480 
deposits 
Total U.S. Use 
PL 480 Funds 
Annual Rate 
1969-74 1969-79 
30.4 20.5 
20.4 13.0 
43.5 32.6 
18.4 13.3 
11.9 12.2 
19.6 14.2 
Source: Calculated from the data in Table 4. 
of Increase·A-
1969-84 1969-2010 
13.9 2.9 
8.1 1.6 
27.7 13.1 
10.5 4.2 
11.8 8.5 
12.4 6.6 
* These are worked out by fitting the function Y = abt, where t is the time 
(independent variable) and Y is the series of each component separately. 
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Table 6. The Average Contribution of Various Components to U.S. Rupee 
Funds on the Basis of Agreements Entered Up To The End of 
fiscal year 1969 
Variables 
1. Principal repayment of 
Cooley loans 
2. Interest payments on 
Cooley loans 
3. Loan repayments by the 
GOI (Section 1,P4 f) 
4. Interest payment by 
GOI (Section 104 f) 
s. Interest deposits 
Total U.S. use PL 480 
rupee funds 
~he 
Periods 
1969-74 1969-79 1969-84 
12.1 12.0 9.0 
7.9 5.9 3.7 
10.0 15.5 23.9 
60.8 55.6 49.3 
9.2 10.9 14.1 
100 100 100 
Source: Calculations are based on data presented in Table 4. 
1969-2010 
1.6 
0.5 
48.0 
2:4.3 
25.8 
100 
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contribution of other components increases (loan repayment installments 
increase in geometrical progression). For the period as a whole, however, 
the contribution of this source would be as high as 25 percent of the 
increase in the total U.S.-owned P.L. 480 counterpart funds, despite such 
a low rate of interest as 1.5 percent. 
The significance of these accumulating U.S.-owned funds can be high-
lighted by looking into the proportions of these funds to the projected 
total money supply in the economy. To do so, of course, will require 
projections of the money supply itself. In India, a number of models 
(both single equation and simultaneous equation) have b~en tried to esti-
mate the money demand functions [ 22]. These m&!e.\~., h~y;fi been recently 
surveyed critically by Khusro [15]. One of the most significant explana-
tory variables common to all the models has been national income. Since 
the projections of national income are available with some degree of 
certainty, we have used national income as the only explanatory variable 
in money demand function, and we have added the intercept term to pick up 
the effect of the rest of the explanatory variables. This, no doubt, is 
a crude method, but it is sufficient for our limited purpose (which is to 
visualize the potential significance of the u.s.-owned rupee funds for 
monetary management in the country). The estimated equation (D =a+ bY) 
is as follows: 
D = 9.98 + 0.2050Y 
(0. 0521) 
R2 = 0.97 
where D = Money demand (both currency and demand deposits) and 
Y = National income at current prices in crores of rupees. 
Since, on an ex-post basis, demand for money and money supply are 
- 32 -
equal, we have used money supply data (1950-51 to 1967-68) to estimate 
the above money demand function. This equation means that for every 
increase in national income of one crore rupees, money demand will increase 
by 0.2 crore rupees, or approximately 20 percent. If we further assume 
that money demand is met by a corresponding monetary increase, we can 
project future money supply based on the projections of national income. 
We have made three projections of money supply corresponding to three 
projections of national income (at current prices). The three projections 
of national income are: (a) a 4-percent increase (implying a slight de-
cline in prices, if output grows by 6-percent), (b) a 6-percent increase 
(the Plan target and with no increase in prices), and (c) an 8-percent 
increase (which implies an increase in prices). These three estimates are 
termed as low, medium, and high estimates of national income, and, corres-
pondingly, three estimates of money supply are calculated. These estimates 
of money supply are then used to determine the proportion that surplus 
U.S.-owned rupee funds in India will make up the total money supply. The 
magnitude of surplus U.S. use funds has been determined by deducting the 
expected withdrawals by the U.S. Embassy in India out of these funds. 
There is no exact estimate of the U.S. needs for rupee funds in the near 
future. The u.s. Embassy officials put it at Rs. 400 million crores per 
19 
annum. On the other hand, USAID officials put the estimate at Rs. 445.4 
million or Rs. 44.54 crores (which was the level actually obtained in the 
19This estimate was discussed during my meeting with some of the 
Embassy officials at Financial Attache's office in New Delhi in February 
1970. 
- 33 -
fiscal year 1969, Appendix B-4). 20 We have set the expected withdrawals 
for the U.S. uses at the highest of these two estimates, i.e., 44.54 crores 
per annum. The proportion that surplus funds make up of the projected 
21 
money supply is presented in Table 7. 
It will be seen in Table 7 that 1968-69 through 1983-84 the propor-
tion of surplus U.S.-owned P.L. 480 funds would range between 3.11 percent 
and 5.68 percent under high, medium and low assumptions about the increase 
in money supply. If one considers the proportion of the total U.S.-owned 
rupee funds in India to the projected money supply, the proportion ranges 
between 7.45 percent and 13.62 percent until the end of 1984. The conse-
quences of using these funds will be taken up in the following part. 
Use of Surplus U.S.-Owned Rupee Funds 
Before we proceed with the discussion on the use of surplus U.S.-
owned funds, it should once again be pointed out that the official alloca-
tion of these funds will now take place when the real aid has already 
been absorbed into the economy in previous years. The official allocation 
of these surplus funds for Indian use can occur within the framework of 
the existing Plan or may be achieved by enlarging the Plan. Therefore, 
these allocations will either be neutral to Plan expenditures (and thereby 
20AID estimates have been picked up from my discussion with loan 
disbursement officials at the AID Mission in New Delhi. However, the 
assumptions about the future are from my own judgment about the discussions 
with the officials. 
21 
The only reasonable basis for the projections of national income 
was found up to 1983-84. Therefore, we have confined our illustration of 
the potential magnitude of surplus funds up to 1983-84, but as discussed 
before, surplus funds would continue to accrue long after this date. 
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neutral to money supply) or they will be in addition to the existing Plan 
expenditure (and thereby expansionary in impact for money supply). A 
detailed discussion of these alternatives follows after the description of 
the provisions for the Mondale Amendment. 
Mondale Amendment 
Before the addition of the Mondale Amendment to Section 104 of P.L. 
480, the u.s.-owned local currency funds could be used only for the United 
States purposes and third-country assistance purposes listed in sub-sections 
(a) to (j). Even under these legal provisions, the u.s. authorities in 
India were not free to use surplus P.L. 480 funds at their discretion. 
All uses persuant to Sections 104 (a) and (b) were subject to the appro-
priation processes of the U.S. Congress. Thus, if the u.s. authorities 
in India wanted to increase their expenditures, they found it necessary 
to increase their dollar appropriations, to ask for a special foreign 
currency appropriation, or to otherwise substitute their dollar-funded 
projects with rupee holdings. Consequently, despite the fact that surplus 
P.L. 480 rupees were available, they could not be used in unlimited quantities. 
The Mondale Amendment provides for certain exceptions to the norm 
. h d . h "d d . 22 w1t regar to countr1es t at are cons1 ere excess-currency countr1es. 
Under the Mondale Amendment, excess funds can be used for two types of 
purposes: (a) for the acquisition of sites, building and grounds by the 
United States, and (b) for assistance to the recipient country in under-
taking measures of self-help to increase its production of agricultural 
commodities and its facilities for the storage and distribution of such 
22 Excess-currency countries are those in which the foreign currencies 
or credits owned by the United States are in excess of the u.s. needs for 
the next two fiscal years. 
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commodities. Exceptions (a) and (b) differ in their economic effect. 
Although exception (a) would add to aggregate current consumption expen-
diture of the GOI, assistance for undertaking self-help measures could 
remain neutral or expansionary to budgetary expenditure, depending upon 
whether the allocations were for projects already included in the Plan 
or for projects added to the Plan. We have already taken into account 
expenditures under exception (a) while working out surplus rupee funds. 
Further discussion, therefore, here will explore the consequences of 
allocating surplus funds for Indian use. 
Plan Projects 
TheMondaleAmendment provides for the allocation of surplus funds 
in excess-currency countries for projects that promote agricultural develop-
ment and other measures of self-help. The five-year Plans being imple-
mented in India have the project mix that contains all of these kinds of 
projects. One way to use the surplus funds would be to give assistance for 
some of the projects listed in the Plan. In this event, if we recollect 
the analysis in the previous section, we will recall that there would 
be no effect on monetary flows. This can be illustrates as follows: 
The GO! Budget 
In-comings Out-goings 
Grants from the u.s. Embassy +100 Special Securities -100 
The grants of u.s.-owned rupee funds would be just equal to the 
funds thatwere required for redeeming the special securities. Therefore, 
there would be no expansion or reduction in the money supply, and hence, 
- 37 -
no budgetary deficit or surplus. Thus, the projects tied to these funds 
would in fact be financed as they have been financed earlier. In this 
situation, since the project would already be a part of the budget, tying 
it to P.L. 480 funds would not necessitate any additional expenditure in 
the economy (which has not been taken into account in the Plan). 
This procedure makes the official allocations of surplus funds 
neutral to the Plan, and indeed, amounts to a permanent freezing of the 
funds. Since there is no economic effect, surplus P.L. 480 funds can be 
given to the GOI in any manner, either as a fixed amount or at some rate 
synchronized with the accrual of these funds. 
Projects That Enlarge the Plan 
If the surplus funds were used for purposes other than Plan projects, 
their use would generate additional monetary flows into the economy via 
the GOI budgetary deficits (or via the enlargement of budgetary deficits, 
if the budget is already in deficit). In this case expenditures on pro-
jects would be over and above what was already planned, and the situation 
would be as given below: 
The GOI Budget 
In-comings 
Grants for projects from the U.s. 
Embassy +100 
Out-goings 
Investment in special 
securities -100 
Expenditures of con-
tracted additional 
projects 
-100 
In this example, if funds worth Rs. 100 were given to the GO! for 
additional projects, they would involve an addition to the GOI expenditure 
- 38 -
worth the same amount. The impact of this investment on the incomes and 
additional demands can be visualized in the simple Keynesian model. Under 
this framework, the investment multiplier (K) is defined as 1 
s+ g+m 
where s, g, and m represent marginal savings, taxation and import rates. 
The sum of the terms in the denominator represents the amount of leakage 
from consumers' hands. The larger the sum, the smaller would be the mul-
tiplier effect. In the Indian situation, values of 9 percent, 9 percent, 
and 8 percent for s, g, and m respectively, have been found appropriate 
r 3l. 23 h b h 1 1 k On t is asis t e Keynesian investment-income mu tip ier wor s out 
to be 3.85. Further, an analysis of the pattern of consumption expendi-
tures on foodgrains based on various rounds of the National Sample Survey 
(GOI) suggests that the expenditure (value of purchased) elasticity for 
cereals in value terms is in the range of 0.5 to 0.6. The corresponding 
quantity elasticities range between 0.35 and 0.45. The elasticity for 
pulses was estimated to be in the range of 0.6 and 0.7 in 
23Appendix Table B-5 presents data on national income, imports of 
commodities and services (M), and the minimum requirements of commodities 
and services at current as well as constant prices. Data are given in 
both current as well as constant prices (base 1960-61). The following 
regression equation uses the data at constant prices to avoid the effects 
of price fluctuations. While the data on national income are available 
for the period 1957-58 through 1967-68 at 1960-61 prices, the data of 
imports and exports at current prices were deflated by their corresponding 
unit value indices of DGCST. As the indices were available with the base 
1958=100 for the period 1960-61 through 1967-68 and with base 1952-53=100 
for the earlier period, both these series were first brought to common 
base (1958=100), and then the base was shifted to 1960-61. The services 
components of exports and imports were also deflated by the general price 
level in the absence of any other reliable indicator. Then each commodity 
group was deflated with its corresponding unit value to arrive at the 
estimates of minimum requirements of imports at 1960-61 prices. The 
estimates of regression equations are as follows: 
(1) M = 101.40 + 0.054SY - 0.2869R R2 = 0.694 
(2.71) (-0.38) 
Continued. 
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24 terms of quantity and 0.7 and 0.9 in terms of value. If we assume the 
coefficient for income elasticity of demand to be 0.5 or 0.6, SO to 60 
percent of increased income will go the purchase of food. Therefore, the 
first thing to look for is the supply of food grains from domestic sources. 
Projections of Foodgrains Supply and Demand in India 
The foodgrain output in India increased at a very low compound rate 
of growth of 3 percent during 1949-50 through 1964-65. On the basis of 
extrapolations from this past trend, recent increases in foodgrain produc-
tions do not appear very spectacular [6]. But a few recent studies have 
concluded that modern technology has finally started playing its role in 
production for the agricultural sector [ 1,43]. Ray [ 24] has recently 
projected foodgrain supply and demand on the basis of exhaustive micro-level 
Footnote 23 continued: 
(2) M = -73.46 + 0.0600Y R2 0.689 
(4.46) 
(3) M = -1430.42 + 0.1189Y + 1.627SR R2 = 0.826 
(5.29) (1. 55) 
(4) M = -438.68 + 0.1089Y R2 = o. 773 (5. 54) 
where M = m1n1mum imports in crores of rupees. 
M = total imports in crores of rupees. 
Y = national income in crores of rupees. 
R = foreign exchange reserves in crores of rupees. 
The value of 8 percent was taken to lie between the minimum and the 
maximum (coefficients in Yin equations 2 and 4). 
T-statistics in parenthesis 
24 These elasticity figures are from an unpublished Planning Commission 
(GOI) working paper on the projection of foodgrain demand. 
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estimates of foodgrain production crop by crop and state by state. The 
projections of foodgrain supply have been made on the basis of projected 
supply of modern inputs (including the spread and better use of irrigation 
resources). The projections of foodgrain demand (at aggregate level) have 
been calculated by first working out the projections of per-capita demand 
in rural and urban sectors (state by state) and then by multiplying them 
with the population estimates. The per-capita demand estimates have been 
worked out by using the following relations [24]: 
X = X(e -e) I v(e - e ) 
u r r u 
and (1 - v) X + vX = X 
r u 
where v = the proportion of urban population to total population 
X = the estimated average per capita foodgrains demand 
e = the income elasticity coefficient 
r,u = the rural and urban sectors, respectively. 
The income elasticity coefficient for all-India has been estimated 
at 0.55. The values of e and e have been put at 0.60 and 0.30 [25]. 
r u 
On the basis of these coefficients and of projected national income figures 
(5.0, 5.5 and 6.0 percent, respectively (compound rates) during Fourth, 
Fifth and Sixth Plans), and on the basis of population estimates, food-
grain demands have been projected up to the year 1983-84. These estimates, 
along with the foodgrain supply estimates, are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8 shows that the projections of foodgrain supply (normal 
weather) and demand will be in balance up to 1983-84. Although there are 
year-to-year fluctuations in output because of weather, these can be taken 
care of by a policy of buffer stock operation fxnm domestic sources, 
These foodgrain supply and demand estimates show that, despite the 
"green revolution" and the associated upward shift in production functions, 
there is no evidence of any surplus availability of foodgrains from domestic 
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sources that can be used to match the additional demand for foodgrains 
created by expenditures from U,S,-owned surplus rupee funds. In these 
circumstances, if these funds are used without a supporting supply of 
additional foodgrains, they will force price rises over and above what 
is already implied in the Plans. 
Table 8. Projected Foodgrain Demand and Supply, All-India 
1968-69 1973-74 1978-79 1983-84 
(in million tons) 
Demand for all foodgrains 106.46 129.27 158.99 
for human consumption 89.44 108.59 133.55 
seed, feed, and wastage 17.04 20.68 25.44 
Production of foodgrains 94.01 129.27 158.99 
Source: Ray [24]. 
An Estimate of Additional Food Aid Needed If The Surplus U.S.-Owned 
Rupee Funds Are to Be Utilized With A Minimum Multiplier Effect 
198.62 
166.84 
31.78 
198.62 
If the additional projects are to be set up out of surplus U.S.-owned 
funds, the resulting multiplier effect could be minimized by making addi-
tional grants of foodgrains (under Title II). Let us assume that a pro-
ject of Rs. 100 crore investment is begun and that, out of it, Rs. 70 
crores go directly for wage payments, Rs. 20 crores go for purchase of 
other services and materials domestically, and Rs. 10 crores go to purchase 
of equipment from abroad. Under these assumptions and previously stated 
values of marginal rates of savings, taxes, and imports, the aggregate 
impact of 100 crores investment on selected economic variables is presented 
in Table 9. 
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If the food demand arising out of the investment is met by aid, the 
multiplier effect itself is dampened (1.4850 instead of 3.85 before), 
mainly because domestic producers do not increase their income out of 
additional demand for food during various rounds. The total impact of 
100 crores of investment will exhaust itself in 10 rounds of expenditure. 
In India, it is considered reasonable to assume an income-expenditure 
lag of three months, or four rounds of expenditure [14]. On this basis 
it will take two and a half years to exhaust the impact of Rs. 100 crores 
of additional investment, which will generate an additional food demand 
of 60.43 crores in money terms. 
A weighted average of various foodgrain prices in India shows that 
Rs. 105 crores are equivalent to 1 million tons of foodgrains at 1970-71 
prices. On this basis, additional demand of Rs. 60.43 crores is equivalent 
to 0.561 million tons in quantity terms. If the surplus (total) accumula-
tion of the U.S.-owned funds in India up to 1984 (Rs. 1970.58 - Rs. 668.10 
for the U.S. expenditure) is to be utilized, additional food demand generated 
out of this investment would be about 7.3 million tons spread over the next 
17-year period up to 1984. If this magnitude of total food aid is pro-
vided under Title II during the next 17 years, which amounts to an average 
of less than half a million tons of food every year, surplus funds can be 
used to create additional projects. 
Thus, to sum up it may be said that the u.s.-owned rupee funds will 
accumulate up to the year 2010. These accumulations are much in excess of 
the u.s. needs in India. Surplus funds can be used by India, however, 
under the flexibility granted by the Mondale Amendment. The use of these 
funds for Indian purposes can be either neutral to the Plan or enlarge it, 
- 44 -
depending on whether the funds are linked to Plan projects or are to be an 
addition to the Plan. If these funds are to be used within the existing 
Plan, their effect on money supply will be neutral, as discussed above. 
If these funds are to be used to enlarge the Plan, however, their use will 
involve an additional monetary flow into the economy since the GO! will 
then have to find funds to redeem the special securities unlike the other 
situation (it will be recalled that the real effect of aid is already 
over in previous years and now only official accumulations of rupee funds 
remain). If a surplus of food from domestic sources becomes available, the 
multiplier effect of additional investment can be kept minimal. But the 
projections of foodgrain supply and demand do not show any evidence of 
surplus food emerging from domestic sources. Under these circumstances, 
unless a small amount of external food aid is available, surplus rupee 
funds cannot be used for additional projects without causing an inflationary 
pressure over and above the one planned. An estimate shows that an invest-
ment of Rs. 100 crores creates additional demand for food of 0.561 million 
tons in three years at 1970-71 Indian prices. 
- 45 -
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENT IMPACT OF CHANGED TERMS OF P.L.480 AID* 
During the entire period of planning, the foreign exchange constraint 
has been a limiting factor on the growth of the economy. To relieve this 
constraint, India has received foreign aid of the magnitude of $14,823 
million ($17,366 million authorized) up to the end of 1969-70. Consequently, 
debt-service charges have reached as high as $506 million in 1969-70. 
This means that foreign exchange availability to this extent had to be 
used only for debt-service rather than for crucial and much needed imports. 
The debt-service ratio25 has reached as high as 27 percent (Table 10), which 
is far above the level of debt-service ratio considered critical [4]. A 
continuous increase in debt-service ratio has reduced the level of net aid 
availability which was already reduced because of a lower level of gross 
aid inflow. 
It will be seen in Table 10 that the debt-service ratio has risen 
from 13.74 in 1961-62 to 27.44 in 1969-70. At the same time, the propor-
tion of total debt-service charges (amortization and interest payments) 
to gross aid disbursement has gone up from 26.86 in 1960-61 to 42.06 in 
1969-70. This increase ·in the proportion of total debt-service charges 
to gross aid disbursements indicates the resulting decline in net aid 
availability to the country from all the sources. 
* An earlier draft of this section has been published in the Indian 
Journal of Commerce, Vol. 23, No. 84, September 1970. 
25The ratio of debt-service charges to export earnings has been 
termed as the debt-service ratio. 
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There have been considerable improvements in terms of aid in general 
in recent years (though they are not yet at the level considered desirable). 26 
The weighted average rate of interest has come down to 2.2 percent in 
1967-68 from the peak level of 4.1 percent in 1964-65 (Table 11). The 
weighted average grace period has risen from 5.1 years to 7.4 years, and 
the maturity period has increased from 20. 3 yea·rs to 30.8 years over the 
f . 27 same span o t1me. There have been some offsetting trends, however, 
which have contributed to the hardening of terms of a portion of aid. The 
1966 Amendment of P.L. 480, which provides for a gradual shift from (Title I) 
export repayable in local currency to long-term loans repayable in dollars 
(Title IV), is a case in point. Previously, all P.L. 480 assistance was 
on grant-like terms in the sense that only a very small portion of the 
counterpart funds was used for meeting the u.s. obligations in the recip-
ient countries in place of dollar expenditures. But, in view of the 1966 
Amendment, recent agreements with recipient countries contain an increasing 
proportion of amounts repayable in dollars. 
Grant Element in P.L. 480 Convertible Currency Sale Agreement 
An idea of the hardening of terms of P.L. 480 aid can be had by cal-
culating what has been termed "grant-element" in the recent P.L. 480 agree-
ments between India and the United States. The grant-element of these 
loans is worked out by summing the stream of repayments due to loans after 
26Recently, the Pearson Commission recommended the desired terms of 
aid as follows: Rate of interest not more than 2 percent 
Maturity period 25-40 years 
Grace period 7-10 years 
27 Data on terms of aid as a whole were not available after 1967-68, 
therefore, we have used 1967-68 terms. 
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dividing it by a discount factor embodying the compound rate of discount 
( . ) 28 1.nterest • 
Table 11. Weighted Average of Rate of Interest, Grace Period and Terms 
of Maturity of the External Debt 
Years Rate of Inter- Grace Period 
est (percentage) (years) 
1962-63 3.81 5.7 23.9 
1963-64 3.75 6.0 24.9 
1964-65 4.10 5.1 20.3 
1965-66 3.31 5.9 29.3 
1966-67 2.39 5.8 27.7 
1967-68 2.20 7.4 30.8 
Notes & sources: (1) The data above the line pertain to the developing 
countries as a whole taken from "Foreign Aid: A 
Symposium Survey and an Appraisal" Indian Council 
of Current Affairs, p. 512. 
(2) The data below the line have been worked out from 
the aid authorized to India (source by source and 
loan by loan). 
The percentage-repayable-in-dollars in P.L. 480 agreements has 
increased from 20 in the Jun~ 196~ agreement to 60 in the Octobe~ 1969, 
agreement (Table 12). Taking this increase into account, the total grant-
element (aggregate of both dollar repayable and rupee repayable portions of 
28 The concept of grant-element was introduced by Pincus [21], this 
can be written as follows: 
i=T 
L = l:: 
i=l (l+_g_)i 
100 
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loan together) has fallen from 100 percent to 80.6 percent in the last 
agreement. If the remainder of the terms continue as they were in the 
last agreement, it is likely that when 100 percent of P.L. 480 is made re-
payable in dollars, the grant-element will decline to 67.7 percent. 29 
This drop clearly brings out the sharp effect of hardening the terms of 
aid. 
Now, to see the implications of this hardening of P.L. 480 aid in 
the totality of debt-service obligations of India, we have to project: 
(i) amortization and interest payment obligations of India on the basis of 
existing loans, (ii) amortization and interest payment obligations of the 
future aid receipts on the basis of a set of assumptions, and (iii) an 
estimate of additional burden of amortization and interest payments imposed 
by the changed terms of P.L. 480 aid on the basis of a different set of 
assumptions. 
Projections of Debt-Service Obligations 
To project India's debt-service obligations on the basis of existing 
loan agreements (up to 1970-71), we have to sum the repayment installments 
on each loan agreement. This can be done with the help of the repayment 
schedule attached to each loan agreement. These figures are presented in 
Table 13. To project the amortization and interest payment arising out 
Footnote 28 continued: 
Where L the face value of the loan 
T the maturity in years 
C. = capital payment due at the end of the year i 
I: = interest payments due at the end of the year i 
1 q compound rate of discount 
29we have used a 10-percent rate of discount in calculating grant-
element, as is the current practice in the United NationsStudies. However, it may 
be noted that with a smaller discount rate the grant-element will be lowered 
further. 
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of future inflow of aid, an assumption about the level of aid itself is 
required. There are three possible ways of arriving at such a level: (i) 
by using the figures of the Plan document of the GOI, (ii) by calculating 
a figure from the application of trade limited growth models, and (iii) by 
arbitrarily assuming a level. In regard to the Plan document figures, it 
may be said that they seem on the lower side unless the recent increases 
in exports of nontraditional goods can be sustained. The application of 
a trade-limited growth model becomes meaningless at the aggregate level 
unless one considers the elasticities of imports and exports of major 
commodities. No such detailed estimates are available for recent years. 
So we have assumed that the gross level of foreign aid at $1,067 million 
(level of average aid during 1967-68 and 1969-70) per annum, which excludes 
P.L. 480 aid, will continue until the end of the period (1983-84). Total 
aid during the Fourth Plan on this basis works out to be only slightly 
higher than what is aimed at in the Plan document. Then we have used a 
weighted average set of terms for foreign aid to India (rate of interest, 
grace period, and maturity period) during 1965-66, 1966-67, and 1967-68. 
On the basis of these assumptions, the future requirements of amortization 
and interest payments arising from future foreign aid receipts are worked 
out by the following relations. Given an annual external aid flow stream 
C for the first T years with each under the conditions of: (a) a grace 
period of n years, (b) a maturity period of N years and (c) equal install-
ments of repayments each within (N-n) years, the amount to pay in the t-th 
year (t - n ~ T) is 
(t-n)C 
N-n 
- 53 -
Also, the interest in the t-th year is worked out as 
(i) (t-1) C. r 
(ii) Et-1) c _ (t-n)c:l (N- n) _j · r 
for 1 < t < n 
for t > n 
The projections of debt-service charges on the basis of existing aid 
agreements and inflow of new aid are presented in Table 13. The level of 
debt-service charges on the basis of existing loans will start declining 
slowly after 1972. Still, these charges are going to remain as high as 
$550 million at the end of the Fourth Plan, $442 million at the end of the 
Fifth Plan and $315 million at the end of the SixthPlan. The main reason 
for such a high level of debt-service charges, even on the basis of exist-
ing agreements, is the harder terms of aid during the Second and early 
Third Five-Year Plan. Further, on the basis of a set of assumptions about 
annual inflow of aid, rate of interest, maturity period, and grace period, 
additional amortization charges will be $93 million at the end of 1978-79 
and $372 million at the end of 1983-84. Thus, the overall debt service 
charges will increase from $575 million in 1970-71 to $1,051 million in 
1983-84. On the basis of this projection, net capital inflow will become 
almost zero in 1983-84. 
Future Imports Under P.L. 480 
As long as P.L. 480 imports were paid in rupees, they were not adding 
anything to debt-service charges. But, with the changed terms, these im-
ports have added to amortization and interest payment problems. Again, 
a set of assumptions must be made with regard to future P.L. 480 imports 
for projecting amortization and interest payments. 
Foodgrains supply and demand projections presented in the previous 
section showed that, given normal weather, demand and supply will be in 
equilibrium without imports for the first time in the year 1971-72. But 
- 54 -
weather fluctuations and buffer-stockpiling needs may well require food imports 
up to 1973-74. Therefore, we have used two different assumptions about imports 
and have termed them more probable (imports up to 1971-72) and less 
probable (imports up to 1973-74). We put the volume of imports at 3 mil-
lion tons annually (in value terms it means about $220 million: $210 
million as price and $10 million as transport). On this basis, two esti-
mates of amortization and interest payments due to P.L. 480 imports are 
presented(Table 1~. The additional burden of debt-service charges result-
ing from the changed terms of P.L. 480 aid will increase from $2.64 million 
in 1969-70 to $73.77 million in 1983-84, on the basis of the less probable 
assumption, and to $55.88 million in 1983-84, on the basis of the more 
probable assumption. It may also be noted that the debt-service charges 
will continue to accrue for another 25 to 30 years beyond the period con-
sidered here (as the maturity period of these loans is 40 years). 
These additional debt-service charges in totality with other charges 
are presented in Table 15. While the index of debt-service charges would 
have gone up to 229 in 1983-84 (base 1968-69 = 100) in the absence of 
hardening of terms of P.L. 480 aid, it will now increase to 245 on the 
basis of assumption I (about P.L. 480) and 241 on the basis of assumption 
II (about P.L. 480) in 1983-84. The overall impact of these projections 
of debt-service charges can be seen in the estimates of debt-service ratios 
and inflow of net aid. 
Projected Debt-Service Ratio 
To obtain the projections of the debt-service ratio, we must first 
project the level of exports. An exercise in exports projection undertaken 
by the Planning Commission up to 1980-81 puts the target of a 7-percent 
increase over that of 1967-68. 30 Although there have been year-to-year 
30These figures have been derived from the Fourth Five-Year Plan 
Outline, GOI, New Delhi, India, 1970. 
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fluctuations in exports, it is expected on an average that the target will 
at least be achieved for the Fourth Plan [10]. World demand for some of 
the traditional Indian exports, like tea and jute, has weakened considerably 
in recent years, but exports of nontraditional commodities, like iron ore, 
iron and steel manufactures, ferro-manganese and alloys,mineral fuels and 
lubricants, chemicals and plastic products, and rubber manufactures, have 
shown considerable increases. It is too early yet, however, to say any-
thing about the achievement of the targeted rate up to 1983-84 because, 
unless certain scarce inputs are available from imports, exports of engin-
eering and manufactured goods may not keep up. Therefore, in projecting 
the debt-service ratio we have used three alternative assumptions about 
exports: (a) assumption I (7-percent rate of growth in exports), (b) 
assumption II (6-percent rate of growth in exports, and (c) assumption III 
(5-percent rate of growth in exports). 
We found that, if exports increase at a linear rate of 7-percent 
for 1967-68, the debt-service ratio will increase from 25.29 in 1968-69 
to 31.69 in 1983-84, on the basis of assumption I of P.L. 480 imports, 
and to 31.19 in 1983-84, on the basis of assumption II of P.L. 480 (Table 16). 
The debt-service ratio will increase faster if the exports do not maintain 
a rate of growth of 7-percent. For instance, if the rate of growth of 
exports is 6-percent, the debt-service ratio will range between 33.7 and 
34.3 in 1983-84, and if the rate of growth in exports is 5-percent, the 
ratio will range between 36.7 and 37.3 in 1983-84. As stated before, the 
net aid will become zero even if the gross level of aid inflow remains at 
the present level in 1983-84. In this sense, the change in terms of P.L. 
480 aid may be said to have necessitated even more rescheduling of external 
- 58 -
Table 16. Projected Debt-Service Ratios 
Assumption Projected debt- Projected debt- Projected debt-
underlying Years service ratio 
service ratio service ratio 
total debt- (Assumption I) q\ssumption II) (Assumption III) 
service charges (7-percent) (6-percent) (5-percent) 
Assumption I of 
P.L. 480 imports 1968-69 25.29 25.29 25.29 
1973-74 26.35 27.52 28.78 
1978-79 26.20 27.95 29.88 
1983-84 31.69 34.30 37.32 
Assumption II of 
P.L. 480 imports 1968-69 25.29 25.29 25.29 
1973-74 26.20 27.34 28.60 
1978-79 25.90 27.61 29.57 
1983-84 31.19 33.73 36.76 
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debts in a situation in which the need for debt rescheduling is already 
very intense. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this study was to examine the issue of 
additional monetary expansion caused by P.L. 480 counterpart fund gener-
ation and use in a long-term perspective, concentrating on the time when 
imports come to an end. To orient this analysis, the expansionary impact 
on money supply caused by P.L. 480 counterpart funds during the years 
when food imports were continuing has also been examined. In addition, the 
study has attempted to estimate the effect of recent hardening (shift from 
Title I to Title IV) of the terms of P.L. 480 aid on debt-service ratios 
and on net aid availability. 
The issue of additional monetary expansion resulting from counterpart 
funds was considered in Section I where it was emphasized that the overall 
inflationary or deflationary implications of P.L. 480 counterpart funds 
cannot be delineated merely on the basis of changes in money supply. This 
is because P.L. 480 aid also involves an inflow of real commodities into 
the economy. It is difficult to understand, therefore, how this aid could 
be inflationary. The allegation of inflationary implications is based on 
the fact that P.L. 480 aid commodities and their sale proceeds have been 
absorbed into the economy in the very year of their imports, whereas the 
official disbursement of counterpart funds takes place at some other future 
date, a phenomenon referred to as time lag. This study evolves a simple 
model to measure the changes in money supply caused by P.L. 480 aid. The 
model explodes the myth of alleged inflationary implications of counterpart 
- 60 -
funds by showing that the effect of time lags between accruals and with-
drawals of counterpart funds has not created any expansion in money supply 
so far. It was found that the impact of counterpart funds operations on 
money supply was neutral. Furthermore, P.L. 480 has helped to mobilize 
a larger volume of monetary resources by way of sale proceeds for financing 
development. It also was found that, between 1956-57 and 1968-69, the 
average net support, per annum, over the period as a whole, was 5.72 
percent of the GOI budget. India has now reached a point at which P.L. 480 
imports are no longer necessary. Consequently, the GOI will have to mobi-
lize more monetary resources to replace the P.L. 480 monetary support. 
This is not the end of the problem, however, since P.L. 480 funds will 
continue to accrue up to the year 2010 (even on the basis of existing 
agreements). The withdrawals of these funds will take place at a time 
when the real aid and its sale proceeds have already been absorbed into 
the economy in previous years. The problems associated with the accumu-
lations and use of U.S.-owned rupee funds will remain to be faced by India 
and by many other recipient countries for years to come. 
The U.S.-owned P.L. 480 funds accrue from five main sources: (a) loan 
repayments by the GOI, (b) interest payments by the GOI, (c) loan repay-
ments by private firms under Cooley loans, (d) interest payments under 
Cooley loans, and (e) interest earned on the special securities in which 
the funds are invested till the final disbursement of counterpart funds. 
A detailed analysis of the generation and use of these funds was attempted 
in Section II. 
These P.L. 480 rupee funds for the U.S. use total Rs. 267 crores. 
However, if one includes all rupee funds (P.L. 480 and other than P.L. 480 
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as well), the total at the end of fiscal year 1969 was at Rs. 551 crores. 
These funds will increase at the rate of 6.6 percent to the year 2010 if 
nothing is done with them. About 70 percent of this increase will come 
from sources (a) and (b) mentioned previously. These funds are to be used 
for the u.s. purposes in India and for third-country assistance as well. 
If the u.s.-use and third-country assistance ,expenditure in India is put 
at Rs. 44.54 crores (basis of assumption discussed in the text), surplus 
accumulations will continue to accrue until the end of the century. Before 
the Mondale Amendment, these surplus funds could not be diverted for 
Indian use since their use was subject to appropriation by the U.S. Congress, 
which considered them at par with additional assistance. But the Mondale 
Amendment gives a legal sanction to their use by the recipient country in 
surplus-currency countries. A surplus-currency country is defined as a 
country in which the U.S.-owned local currency funds are in excess of 
requirement for the next two years. Thus in India surplus U.S. use funds 
can be diverted for Indian use. 
If we start from a situation in which P.L. 480 aid has already 
ceased and sale proceeds have already been absorbed into the economy, the 
withdrawals for meeting U.S. needs' (Rs. 44.54 crores per annum) will in-
evitably be expansionary, for money supply, as GOI budget is already in 
deficit, and tax receipts are not sufficient to finance development as 
well as nondevelopment outlay. But the portion of surplus U.S.-owned 
rupee funds diverted for Indian use could be neutral or expansionary for 
money supply, depending on how the funds are released. If the funds are 
officially disbursed for the existing Plan projects, budgetary support 
(the concept of net support evolved in earlier section) will be zero, as 
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it will involve two bookkeeping entries in the budget papers of the GOI. 
But if the U.S. insists on establishing additional projects (projects in 
addition to the existing Plan), the net support to the GOI budget will 
become negative and will involve a net outgo from the budget, resulting in 
an expansion of money supply and a consequent impact on the aggregate 
excess demand. This increase in aggregate excess demand resulting from 
use of surplus funds would be small if the surplus food were to become 
available domestically (we are analyzing under the assumption that no food 
imports are taking place now) since the income elasticity of demand is 
very high in India. But the estimates of projected foodgrain production 
and demand in India do not show any surplus even up to 1983-84. In such 
circumstances, the multiplier effectofadditional monetary inflow into 
the economy can be minimized only by granting additional food aid under 
Title II. An estimate shows that an investment of Rs. 100 crores generates 
an additional demand for food of 0.561 million tons in three years at 
1970-71 Indian prices. On this basis, if the surplus (total) accumulations 
of the u.s.-owned funds in India,up to 1984 are to be used, an additional 
demand generated out of this investment will be about 7.3 million tons 
spread over the next 17-year period up to 1984. If this magnitude of 
total food aid is provided under Title II during the next 17 years, which 
amounts to an average of less than half a million tons of food every year, 
surplus funds can be used to create additional projects (over and above 
those already planned) with a minimum multiplier effect. Thus, the U.S. 
authorities are faced with the following two choices in relation to accumu-
lating counterpart funds: 
(i) Linking the surplus funds with the existing Plan projects. This choice 
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would amount to a permanent freezing of the funds and would be neutral 
to money supply since the net support of the GOI budget would be zero. 
It would also save the additional administrative cost in keeping 
track of funds that do not add to real resources. 
(ii) Insisting on additional projects. In this case, the multiplier effects 
of these expenditures in terms of additional excess demand would 
result in price increases, and the contention that the funds have 
inflationary implications would prove valid (although it was not 
valid when the allegation was made). These inflationary pressures 
could be minimized only be granting small amount of additional food 
aid, which would otherwise not be needed (as economic demand and 
domestic supply are in balance at the present level). The use of 
funds will cause an additional demand for scarce materials and sup-
plies that are not available from domestic sources. 
The balance of payments implications of a recent hardening of the 
terms of P.L. 480 aid were dealt with in Section III. It was found that 
the hardening of P.L. 480 would be one of the factors that contribute to 
an increase in the debt-service ratio from 27.44 in 1969-70 (which is 
already considered critical) to a range of 31 to 37 in 1983-84. This would 
also shift the period of zero net aid sooner than otherwise. In this 
sense, the hardening of P.L. 480 aid would merely intensify the need for 
debt rescheduling and postponement. It would be unlikely to bring any gain 
to the United States in the near future. 
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APPENDIX A 
! List of Abbreviations 
P.L. 480 =Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance Act, 1954. 
Fair Price Shops = A chain of the Government licensed food shops. 
P.L. 480 foodgrains have been released to public through these shops. 
GOI = Government of India 
Crores = 10 million = 1 crore 
RBI Reserve Bank of India (the central bank of the country) 
SBI = State Bank of India (a government-owned bank) 
First Five Year Plan = (1951-52 to 1955-56) 
Second Five Year Plan = (1956-57 to 1960-61) 
Third Five Year Plan = (1961-62 to 1965-66) 
Fourth Five Year Plan = (1969-70 to 1973-74) 
USAID =United States Agency For International Development 
CARD = Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
DGCST = Director General Central Supplies and Trade 
UN = United Nations 
IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
State Trading Account = An account of GOI Budget which presents the pay-
ments and receipts from the government operations in foodgrains. 
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Appendix Table B-3. Details of the Rupee Loan Agreements With the GOI Under 
P.L. 480 
Sl. Loan No. Amount Repayment Rate of lst repayment 
No. (millions) Instailments interest date 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. 386-G004 1696.90 73 semi-annual @ 3-percent Note A 1.3.63 
installments if paid in $100 million 
commencing four dollars Note B 1.10. 64 
years after the @ 4-percent $100 mill ion 
date of the 1st if paid in Note C l. 2. 6 7 
d!.sbursement rupees $22 million 
2. 386-G009 250.27 A @ 4-percent 1.1.65 
if paid in dollars 
@ 3-percent if 
paid in rupees 
3. 386-G015 972.72 A @ 3.5percent 1. 5. 65 
4. 386-G017 491.90 A @ 4-percent 1.11.65 
s. 386-G053 2567.60 A @ 4-percent Note A 
1.10.66 64.19 
B 
1.2.68 64.19 
c 
1.8.68 64.19 
D 
1.4.69 39.11 
6. 386-G054 189.90 A @ 4-percent 1. 5. 68 
7. )86-G073 166.50 75 semi-annual @ 0. 75-percent 1.6.68 
installments 
commencing 3 
years after the 
date of 1st 
disbursement 
8. 386-G125 1531.90 B @ 0. 75-percent 25.3.69 
9. AID-386-G-132 420.60 B @0.75-percent 6.12.68 
10. 386-G-134 20.80 B @ 0. 75-percent 6.12.68 
•••••••••••••••••• 2 I 
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Appendix Table B-3. Continued 
. 
Sl. Loan No. Amount 
No. (millions) 
1 2 3 
11. 386-G-148 320.70 
12. 386-G-163 2884.43 
13. 386-G-174 658.12 
14. 386-G-178 422.21 
15. 386-G-182 2113.44 
Repayment 
Installments 
4 
B 
61 semi-annual 
installments 
commencing 10 
years after 
the 1st dis• 
bursement 
c 
c 
c 
Rate of 1st repayment 
interest date 
5 6 
@ 1-percent 14.3. 70 
for 10 years 
@2. >percent 
for the remain-
ing period 
@ 1-percent 27.3.77 
for 10 years 
@ 2.5-percent 
for the remain-
ing period 
@ 2-percent 23.3.78 
for 10 years 
@ 2.5-percent 
for the remain-
ing period 
@ 1-percent 23.3.i8 
for 10 years 
@ 2.5-percent 
for the remain-
ing period 
@ 2-percent 23.3.78 
for 10 years 
@ 2.5-percent 
for the remain-
ing period 
Note: There have been five more loan agreements which carry a part of local 
currency repayment and another part as convertible dollar payable sales. 
A - same terms as that of the first loan agreement 
B - same terms as that of the 7th loan agreement 
C - same terms as that of the 12th loan agreement 
Source: P.L. 480 Branches, Ministry of Finance, GOI. 
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Appendix Table B-4. U.S. - Uses Expenditures* 
Period Amount 
(Rs.OOO) 
Cumulative thru June 30, 1962 343,091 
Fiscal.Year 
Ending June 30, 1963 123,258 
II 
" 
1964 148,332 
II It 1965 166,111 
II II 1966 226,651 . 
II II 1967 267,997 
II II 1968 311,443 
II II 1969 445,412** 
Cumulative thru June 30, 1969 2,032,295 
* In addition to the u.s. Embassy's expenditures in India, it includes 
Third Country Assistance, emergency relief to the GOI and special loans 
and grants to the GOI. 
** This includes a grant of Rs. 105 million to the Electrification Corporation. 
Source: Office of the Financial Attache, u.s. Embassy, New Delhi, India. 
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Appendix ~able B-7. Details Of Utilization And Interest Payments On $ Repayable 
P.L, 480 
Stipulated Actual imports or Oce_an trans port Interest 
imports utilization Payments 
Date of agree-
ment/item 
1 
1. 6. 24.67 
Wheat or 
Wheat flour 
2. 9.12.67 
Wheat or 
Wheat flour 
3. 12.30. 67 
Wheat or 
Wheat flour 
4. 12.23.68 
~Tbeat or 
Wheat flour 
5. 4.25.69 
Sorghum 
Q 
Thousand 
Tons 
2 
317.0 
274.0 
678.0 
1025.0 
300.0 
v Q 
Million Thousand 
dollars Tons 
3 4 
22.0 
17.0 
42.1 
64.7 
14.4 
Cotton/oil 100.0* 13.3 
soybeen or 
cotton & oil 22.0 4.8 
6. 10.13.69 2157.0 
Notes: N.A. = Not available 
1. The break-up of 
Date of Payment 
8.12.68 
12.6.69 
8.12.69 
114.9 N.A. 
* Bales 
payment 
Dollars 
293046.98 
2626.11 
233979.68 
529652.77 
v Stipula- Utilized million 
Million ted mil- million dollars 
dollars lion dollars 
dollars 
5 6 7 8 
22,0 2.2 1.7 
17.0 2.0 2.1 
41.6 4.8 3.3 
21.4 6.4 1.2 
13.8 2.0 0.8 
N.A. Not N.A. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Specified 
19.12.68 
29.12.69 
19.12.69 
Total 
11.11.69 
11.12. 69 
183804.51 
19235.47 
174361.21. 
377401.19 
1382534.27 
781231.46 
Source: Chief Account Office. Ministry of Finance, GOI. 
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